Thursday 31st July 2014
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TICKER - WEDNESDAY - JULY 30th: Avanti Mining Inc has entered into a debt financing mandate letter with a syndicate of six lenders to provide secured debt finance facilities worth $612m to develop the Kitsault molybdenum mine. Lenders include BNP Paribas, Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation, Export Development Canada, Korea Development Bank, Mizuho Bank and UniCredit Bank. The facility set out in the term sheet is comprised of $500m senior debt for a term of 10.5 years, $42m in equipment finance for a term of 5 years and $70m in the form of standby cost over-run facilities for a term of 8 years. The interest rate is LIBOR based, loan repayments are semi-annual or quarterly (for equipment finance) and there are mandatory prepayment provisions of a portion of excess free cash flow. The facility will include customary provisions for a financing of this type, including fees, representations and warranties, covenants, events of default and security customary for this type of financing - Jupiter Fund Management reports strong investment performance with assets under management rising to £33.1bn, with the asset manager benefitting from net mutual fund inflows of £875m over the first half of this year. The firm says it has maintained operating margins above 50%. Maarten Slendebroek, chief executive, says “We are pleased with the progress being made on the implementation of our growth strategy during the first half of 2014. The Board’s intention to increase cash returns to shareholders through a combination of ordinary and special dividends reflects this progress and confidence in our future growth potential. We believe this approach will allow shareholders to participate in our organic growth story while receiving an attractive yield.” There will be an analyst presentation to discuss the results on July 30th at 9.00am at FTI Consulting, 200 Aldersgate, Aldersgate Street, London, EC1A 4HD and is also accessible via a live audiocast for those unable to attend in person - CME Clearing says it will remove the Exchange-For-Swap (EFS) identifier for all NYMEX, COMEX and DME exchange futures executed in accordance with CME Rule 538 (Exchange for Related Positions). CME products were removed from EFS eligibility in October of 2010, and CBT products were removed from EFS eligibility in July of 2012. With this final transition, EFS will no longer be a supported transaction type at CME. The EFS transaction type has been harmonized into, and falls under, the Exchange for Risk (EFR) transaction referenced in Rule 538. EFR transactions are privately negotiated transactions (PNT) and include the simultaneous exchange of an Exchange futures position for a corresponding OTC swap or other OTC instrument. In addition, NYMEX, COMEX and DME exchange products will continue to be eligible for Exchange for Physical (EFP) and Exchange of Options for Options (EOO) privately negotiated transactions. Currently, an EFS transaction is represented as a TrdTyp=”12” on TrdCaptRpt messages. Effective on the above date, the TrdTyp value for these transactions should be submitted as “11” (EFR). CME Clearing will reject any NYMEX, COMEX, or DME exchange privately negotiated futures message sent as an EFS. The trade will subsequently need to be resubmitted with a valid transaction type to CME Clearing. Additionally, CME Clearing will re-categorize the Exchange of Options for Options (EOO) transaction type for all CME, CBOT, NYMEX, COMEX, and DME products. Currently, an EOO is represented as an option on an exchange for swap (EFS) in clearing and on FIXML TrdCaptRpt messages. Going forward, an EOO transaction will be represented as an option on an Exchange for Risk (EFR) - Chi-X® Japan Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of alternative market operator Chi-X® Global Holdings LLC, says local brokers Yamawa Securities Co., Ltd. and Ark Securities Co Ltd., have commenced trading on Chi-X Japan, bringing the total number of trading participants to 23. Yamawa Securities and Ark Securities will access its market centre through Intertrade’s platform - The upgrade of the cities of Bogota and Medellin by Moody’s follows the upgrade on Colombia's sovereign ratings and reflects the close economic and operational links that these cities have with the central government. The rating action also reflects Bogota and Medellin's relatively solid financial metrics and moderate debt levels. The ratings assigned to both Bogota and Medellin are supported by their strong economic position in Colombia that includes a high level of own-source revenues and diversified local economies. The positive prospects of economic growth in the country translate in supportive conditions for both cities through higher local economic growth and own-source revenue growth. The assigned ratings also consider the close oversight that Colombia's central government exerts over the country's regional and local governments. Bogota and Medellin show solid governance and management practices that have supported historical low to moderate debt levels and moderate cash financing requirements, says the ratings agency. Between 2011 and 2013, Bogota's cash financing requirements averaged -5.7% of total revenues and net direct and indirect debt averaged 18.4% of total revenues. Medellin's cash financing requirements over the same period averaged -5.8% of total revenues and debt levels averaged 17.6% of total revenues.

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The European Review

By Patrick Artus, chief economist at Natixis

Target 2 accounts: The equivalent of currency interventions, and a very good indicator of the risk that the euro may break up

Wednesday, 20 June 2012 Written by 
Target 2 accounts: The equivalent of currency interventions, and a very good indicator of the risk that the euro may break up When the Bundesbank’s (Germany's) Target 2 account (which is positive) increases while another euro-zone country’s Target 2 account becomes more negative, this is equivalent to a German currency intervention aimed at stabilising the exchange rate between Germany and this other country, and therefore at preventing a break-up of the euro. In a completely similar manner, when China accumulates foreign exchange reserves in dollars to prevent an appreciation of the RMB, the People's Bank of China accumulates an asset and the United States a liability, and there is monetary creation (in RMB). So the size of the Target 2 accounts of the national central banks in the euro zone corresponds to the size of the foreign exchange reserves that the euro-zone countries with a strong currency have to accumulate to prevent a break-up of the euro; it is therefore a very good indicator of the risk of a break-up. http://www.ftseglobalmarkets.com/

When the Bundesbank’s (Germany's) Target 2 account (which is positive) increases while another euro-zone country’s Target 2 account becomes more negative, this is equivalent to a German currency intervention aimed at stabilising the exchange rate between Germany and this other country, and therefore at preventing a break-up of the euro. In a completely similar manner, when China accumulates foreign exchange reserves in dollars to prevent an appreciation of the RMB, the People's Bank of China accumulates an asset and the United States a liability, and there is monetary creation (in RMB). So the size of the Target 2 accounts of the national central banks in the euro zone corresponds to the size of the foreign exchange reserves that the euro-zone countries with a "strong currency" have to accumulate to prevent a break-up of the euro; it is therefore a very good indicator of the risk of a break-up.

The size of the Target 2 accounts held by national central banks in the euro zone

Germany and the Netherlands hold substantial Target 2 assets (respectively EUR 650bn and EUR 140bn), while Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland have substantial Target 2 debts (respectively EUR 98bn, EUR 285bn, EUR 280bn and EUR 117bn).

Fundamentally, these are currency interventions

Let us take, for example, the Germany/Spain pair. If the Bundesbank lends to the Bank of Spain, there is an increase in Germany's positive Target 2 account and in Spain’s negative Target 2 account. This corresponds to a loan from Germany to Spain, or to a purchase of Spanish assets by the German central bank.

If this purchase had not taken place, Spain would be unable to finance its external deficit, and would be forced to pull out of the euro and let its currency depreciate to the point where capital inflows covered its external borrowing requirement.

Therefore, this is the exact equivalent of a currency intervention aimed at ensuring the stability of the exchange rate between Germany and Spain: the country with a "strong currency" buys assets of the country with a "weak currency" to stabilise the exchange rate.

Similarity with the China/United States pair

When China accumulates foreign exchange reserves in dollars to prevent an excessive appreciation of the RMB against the dollar, the People's Bank of China holds US assets and the United States, conversely, has a debt to China.

This operation increases the size of the balance sheet of the People's Bank of China, and therefore leads to monetary creation.

Likewise, when the Bundesbank lends to central banks in the Southern euro-zone countries, and these central banks subsequently lend these funds to the banks in their own countries, there is a creation of monetary base in euros.

Target 2 accounts measure the risk of a break-up of the euro

The size (positive or negative according to the country) of the Target 2 accounts held by the central banks in the euro zone therefore represents the size of the foreign exchange reserves that the euro zone countries with a "strong currency" have to accumulate to ensure the euro’s sustainability ("exchange-rate stability" between euro zone countries). The more the size of these accounts increases, the higher the risk that the euro may break-up.

Positive Target 2 accounts surged from the summer of 2011, and this went hand in hand with a period of pressure on the interest rates on peripheral government bonds and on risk premia on banks.

Patrick Artus

A graduate of Ecole Polytechnique, of Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Adminstration Economique and of Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Patrick Artus is today the Chief Economist at Natixis. He began his career in 1975 where his work included economic forecasting and modelisation. He then worked at the Economics Department of the OECD (1980), before becoming Head of Research at the ENSAE. Thereafter, Patrick taught seminars on research at Paris Dauphine (1982) and was Professor at a number of Universities (including Dauphine, ENSAE, Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Armement, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées and HEC Lausanne).

Patrick is now Professor of Economics at University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. He combines these responsibilities with his research work at Natixis. Patrick was awarded "Best Economist of the year 1996" by the "Nouvel Economiste", and today is a member of the council of economic advisors to the French Prime Minister. He is also a board member at Total and Ipsos.

Website: cib.natixis.com/research/economic.aspx

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