Wednesday 30th July 2014
slib33
TICKER - WEDNESDAY - JULY 30th: Avanti Mining Inc has entered into a debt financing mandate letter with a syndicate of six lenders to provide secured debt finance facilities worth $612m to develop the Kitsault molybdenum mine. Lenders include BNP Paribas, Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation, Export Development Canada, Korea Development Bank, Mizuho Bank and UniCredit Bank. The facility set out in the term sheet is comprised of $500m senior debt for a term of 10.5 years, $42m in equipment finance for a term of 5 years and $70m in the form of standby cost over-run facilities for a term of 8 years. The interest rate is LIBOR based, loan repayments are semi-annual or quarterly (for equipment finance) and there are mandatory prepayment provisions of a portion of excess free cash flow. The facility will include customary provisions for a financing of this type, including fees, representations and warranties, covenants, events of default and security customary for this type of financing - Jupiter Fund Management reports strong investment performance with assets under management rising to £33.1bn, with the asset manager benefitting from net mutual fund inflows of £875m over the first half of this year. The firm says it has maintained operating margins above 50%. Maarten Slendebroek, chief executive, says “We are pleased with the progress being made on the implementation of our growth strategy during the first half of 2014. The Board’s intention to increase cash returns to shareholders through a combination of ordinary and special dividends reflects this progress and confidence in our future growth potential. We believe this approach will allow shareholders to participate in our organic growth story while receiving an attractive yield.” There will be an analyst presentation to discuss the results on July 30th at 9.00am at FTI Consulting, 200 Aldersgate, Aldersgate Street, London, EC1A 4HD and is also accessible via a live audiocast for those unable to attend in person - CME Clearing says it will remove the Exchange-For-Swap (EFS) identifier for all NYMEX, COMEX and DME exchange futures executed in accordance with CME Rule 538 (Exchange for Related Positions). CME products were removed from EFS eligibility in October of 2010, and CBT products were removed from EFS eligibility in July of 2012. With this final transition, EFS will no longer be a supported transaction type at CME. The EFS transaction type has been harmonized into, and falls under, the Exchange for Risk (EFR) transaction referenced in Rule 538. EFR transactions are privately negotiated transactions (PNT) and include the simultaneous exchange of an Exchange futures position for a corresponding OTC swap or other OTC instrument. In addition, NYMEX, COMEX and DME exchange products will continue to be eligible for Exchange for Physical (EFP) and Exchange of Options for Options (EOO) privately negotiated transactions. Currently, an EFS transaction is represented as a TrdTyp=”12” on TrdCaptRpt messages. Effective on the above date, the TrdTyp value for these transactions should be submitted as “11” (EFR). CME Clearing will reject any NYMEX, COMEX, or DME exchange privately negotiated futures message sent as an EFS. The trade will subsequently need to be resubmitted with a valid transaction type to CME Clearing. Additionally, CME Clearing will re-categorize the Exchange of Options for Options (EOO) transaction type for all CME, CBOT, NYMEX, COMEX, and DME products. Currently, an EOO is represented as an option on an exchange for swap (EFS) in clearing and on FIXML TrdCaptRpt messages. Going forward, an EOO transaction will be represented as an option on an Exchange for Risk (EFR) - Chi-X® Japan Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of alternative market operator Chi-X® Global Holdings LLC, says local brokers Yamawa Securities Co., Ltd. and Ark Securities Co Ltd., have commenced trading on Chi-X Japan, bringing the total number of trading participants to 23. Yamawa Securities and Ark Securities will access its market centre through Intertrade’s platform - The upgrade of the cities of Bogota and Medellin by Moody’s follows the upgrade on Colombia's sovereign ratings and reflects the close economic and operational links that these cities have with the central government. The rating action also reflects Bogota and Medellin's relatively solid financial metrics and moderate debt levels. The ratings assigned to both Bogota and Medellin are supported by their strong economic position in Colombia that includes a high level of own-source revenues and diversified local economies. The positive prospects of economic growth in the country translate in supportive conditions for both cities through higher local economic growth and own-source revenue growth. The assigned ratings also consider the close oversight that Colombia's central government exerts over the country's regional and local governments. Bogota and Medellin show solid governance and management practices that have supported historical low to moderate debt levels and moderate cash financing requirements, says the ratings agency. Between 2011 and 2013, Bogota's cash financing requirements averaged -5.7% of total revenues and net direct and indirect debt averaged 18.4% of total revenues. Medellin's cash financing requirements over the same period averaged -5.8% of total revenues and debt levels averaged 17.6% of total revenues.

Blog

The European Review

By Patrick Artus, chief economist at Natixis

Is Greece offered any other choice to a slow death and a sudden death?

Friday, 06 July 2012 Written by 
Is Greece offered any other choice to a slow death and a sudden death? The adjustment programme that Greece is putting in place with the Troika, even if it is toned down and spread out over time, will eventually lead to a fall in Greeks' purchasing power until Greece's external deficit disappears. And in light of Greece's economic structure and the disproportion between its imports and exports, this will imply a collapse in living standards in Greece. The other possibility for Greece is to leave the euro and massively devalue its currency, but this would instantly mean a loss of purchasing power due to the deterioration of the terms of trade, and a massive decline in domestic demand, which would in any case be inevitable because there would then be no more lenders to finance Greece's external deficit. http://www.ftseglobalmarkets.com/

The adjustment programme that Greece is putting in place with the "Troika", even if it is toned down and spread out over time, will eventually lead to a fall in Greeks' purchasing power until Greece's external deficit disappears. And in light of Greece's economic structure and the disproportion between its imports and exports, this will imply a collapse in living standards in Greece. The other possibility for Greece is to leave the euro and massively devalue its currency, but this would instantly mean a loss of purchasing power due to the deterioration of the terms of trade, and a massive decline in domestic demand, which would in any case be inevitable because there would then be no more lenders to finance Greece's external deficit.

For Greece to escape a slow death (austerity programme) or a sudden death (exit from the euro), a massive European aid plan would be needed to rebuild the Greek economy and create jobs, a plan that is unlikely at present, and very different from the present bailout which merely finances debt servicing on Greek government bonds held by public investors.

The logic of the adjustment programme for Greece: Slow death

Even if Greece and the Troika renegotiate the adjustment programme, its fundamental characteristics will remain the same:

·                                  a restrictive fiscal policy to eliminate the fiscal deficit;

·                                  a fall in wages to improve competitiveness and reduce domestic demand, until Greece's external deficit disappears.

The main idea of the adjustment programme is that Greece's domestic demand exceeds its production capacity, thereby generating a structural external deficit. So Greeks "are living beyond their means", with a rise in living standards far exceeding growth in production capacity, and it is therefore legitimate to reduce domestic demand both through a restrictive fiscal policy and wage cuts.

The fall in wages could also bring about an improvement in competitiveness, hence an improvement in foreign trade, but its main objective is to reduce domestic demand and imports.

The problem with this approach is that:

·                                  it is showing its ineffectiveness: despite the decline in domestic demand, the current-account deficit has declined little; due to the shortfall in activity, public finances are no longer improving;

·                                  its cost in terms of jobs and purchasing power is gigantic. Greece is a country in which the weight of industry is very small and where, as a consequence, the disproportion between imports and exports is very great.

A substantial decline in purchasing power in Greece is therefore needed to eliminate the external deficit, with a further fall of about 30% in real wages. Purchasing power would have to be brought back to the level of the early 1990s to balance the current account, and this is of course rejected by the population. The fundamental problem is twofold:

·                                  even if there is a fall in wages, the improvement in price-competitiveness is limited by price stickiness;

·                                  since the size of industry is small, the adjustment must be achieved mainly through a fall in imports, hence a decline in income.

Exit from the euro and devaluation: Sudden death

Faced with this prospect of a "slow death" due to the austerity programme, Greeks could decide to leave the euro and devalue. But in that case the shock would be sudden and terrible, because there would be both:

·                                  a rise in import prices;

·                                  an obligation to eliminate the external deficit, because no one (neither the private sector nor the public sector) would any longer lend to Greece;

·                                  a weak positive impact of the gain in competitiveness, due to the small size of industry.

Greece would default on its gross external debt, and would therefore no longer have to service that debt, which is positive (it would gain six percentage points of GDP in interest payments on external debt). But the rise in import prices would even further exacerbate the foreign trade imbalance, while the potential for external borrowing would disappear. There would inevitably have to be a reduction in domestic demand to restore the foreign trade balance despite the rise in import prices, hence inevitably a collapse in imports in volume terms.

This is reminiscent of the process in Argentina, in similar circumstances, in the early 2000s: a collapse of activity following the huge devaluation, the need to switch to a current-account surplus which required dividing imports by three - hence a collapse in the real wage due to imported inflation, and in domestic demand and employment.

From 2003 onwards, there was  a sharp improvement in Argentina's situation, but it is important to remember that it had considerable structural advantages by comparison with Greece at present:

·                                  substantial weight of industry (22% of jobs);

·                                  before the crisis, exports and imports of the same size;

·                                  a smaller current-account deficit to reduce (five percentage points of GDP).

The shock would be far more violent and prolonged for Greece.

So what would be the solution for Greece?

We have seen that Greece is at present offered two solutions:

·                                  a "slow death", through a stifling of the economy via the austerity plan, even if it is softened down;

·                                  a "sudden death", if there is an exit from the euro and devaluation.

In either case, gradually or suddenly, there must be a substantial decline in purchasing power to eliminate the external deficit which is no longer financeable. For Greece to escape this dreadful choice, Europe's aid would have to be allocated not to debt servicing on Greece's government bonds held by public investors (EFSF, ECB) - which in and of itself is an incredible situation where Europe is borrowing in order to pay to itself the servicing of the Greek debt it holds - but to help rebuild the Greek economy and create jobs, which is definitely not being done at present.

Patrick Artus

A graduate of Ecole Polytechnique, of Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Adminstration Economique and of Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Patrick Artus is today the Chief Economist at Natixis. He began his career in 1975 where his work included economic forecasting and modelisation. He then worked at the Economics Department of the OECD (1980), before becoming Head of Research at the ENSAE. Thereafter, Patrick taught seminars on research at Paris Dauphine (1982) and was Professor at a number of Universities (including Dauphine, ENSAE, Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Armement, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées and HEC Lausanne).

Patrick is now Professor of Economics at University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. He combines these responsibilities with his research work at Natixis. Patrick was awarded "Best Economist of the year 1996" by the "Nouvel Economiste", and today is a member of the council of economic advisors to the French Prime Minister. He is also a board member at Total and Ipsos.

Website: cib.natixis.com/research/economic.aspx

Related News

Related Articles

Related Blogs

Related Videos

Current IssueSpecial Report

Tweets by @DataLend

DataLend is a global securities finance market data provider covering 42,000+ unique securities globally with a total on-loan value of more than $1.8 trillion.

What do our tweets mean? See: http://bit.ly/18YlGjP