Sunday 19th April 2015
NEWS TICKER FRIDAY APRIL 17TH 2015: -On June 9, 2015, the Federal Trade Commission will host a workshop to examine competition, consumer protection, and economic issues raised by the proliferation of online and mobile peer-to peer business platforms in certain sectors of the economy, often referred to as the “sharing economy.” The workshop will take place in Washington, D.C., at the FTC’s Constitution Center conference space. Peer-to-peer platforms, which enable suppliers and consumers to connect and do business, have led to the emergence of new business models in industries that have been subject to regulation. The FTC’s sharing economy workshop will explore how regulatory frameworks can accommodate new sharing economy business models while maintaining appropriate consumer protections and a competitive marketplace. “We are seeing a dramatic growth in products and services that are built on peer-to-peer platforms, such as ride-sharing and property rentals, as more entrepreneurs harness the power of technology to reach more consumers,” says FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez. “The resulting business models have great potential to benefit our economy and consumers. Through our workshop, we want to better understand the competitive impact of these new business models, as well as their interactions with existing regulatory frameworks.” - he Straits Times Index (STI) ended 6.42 points or 0.18% lower to 3525.19, taking the year-to-date performance to +4.76%. The top active stocks today were Keppel Corp, which declined 2.01%, DBS, which gained 0.91%, SingTel, which gained 0.23%, UOB, which gained 0.38% and ComfortDelGro, with a 1.70% advance. The FTSE ST Mid Cap Index fell 0.30%, while the FTSE ST Small Cap Index rose 0.06%. The outperforming sectors today were represented by the FTSE ST Utilities Index, which rose 1.60%. The two biggest stocks of the Index - United Envirotech and Hyflux – ended 5.12% higher and 2.09% lower respectively. The underperforming sector was the FTSE ST Basic Materials Index, which slipped 1.82%. Midas Holdings shares declined 2.56% and Geo Energy Resources remained unchanged - It has been a testing day in the markets, with most stock markets reporting substantial losses. The spectre of another crisis in Greece as the IMF talked tough on the country adhering to its repayment schedule, a terminal outage at Bloomberg and a clampdown on OTC and short selling in China combined to test investor sentiment. The FTSE 100, fell briefly below 7000 to end up finding support at 7007; however Spain's Ibex and Italy's FTSE MIB were both 2% down while the German DAX 30 slid 1.8% and France's CAC 40 fell 1.2% - The outage impacted the UK DMO’s offer of £300m 1 month bill, due 18-May-2015(ISIN GB00BDNKWT09); the £1,000m 3-months bill due 20-Jul-2015 (ISIN GB00BDNLZ833), and the £1,500m 6-months bill due 19-Oct-2015 (ISIN GB00BDNNDG38) was conducted between midday and14.30 today. Any bids submitted in the aborted operation earlier this morning were deemed null and void - Catastrophe bond issuance is forecast to have risen almost 30% so far this year, though the size of the market remains modest. The increase in demand for cat bonds means that some bonds are now trading at a discount to their original issue price for the first time in years. Issuance for the year through to mid-April is predicted to be up 27% on 2014, at around $2.1bn, The full-year trend also looks positive, following on from a record cat bond issuance of $8.4bn in 2014 - Moody's Investors Service has described in detail the approach it takes to allocating expected credit losses across the various classes of debt issued by banks in the US, the EU and Switzerland. The liability hierarchy or "waterfall" that Moody's employs to allocate estimated losses to debt classes in these three jurisdictions incorporates the implications of key structural differences in their bank resolution and bail-in frameworks. In this way, the liability hierarchy aims to capture the prioritisation authorities will give different debt classes when apportioning losses to creditors in the event of a bank's failure. The construction of a given bank's liability structure at failure serves as the starting point of Moody's Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis, instituted as part of its new bank rating methodology. The LGF framework is used to assess and differentiate creditor risk across banks' liability structures, as detailed in Moody's report "How Resolution Frameworks Drive Our Creditor Hierarchies." The bank resolution and bail-in frameworks in the US, EU, and Switzerland all aim to limit the use of public funds in bank resolutions while mitigating risks to financial stability. Important differences in these frameworks include the degree of power authorities have to write down or convert capital instruments, differences in depositor preference, and variations in the obligations of holding companies to their operating companies - Close Brothers has reportedly acquired advisory firm Mackay Stewart & Brown for an undisclosed amount. Andy Cumming, head of advice at Close Brothers Asset Management, said the acquisition would strengthen the national advice firm’s Scottish operation.

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The European Review

By Patrick Artus, chief economist at Natixis

The Calculation for Spain

Tuesday, 31 July 2012 Written by 
The Calculation for Spain To alleviate its debt and escape its state of crisis, we think Spain has two strategies to choose from. The first one, already in place since 2009, involves a reduction in the fiscal and external deficits while accepting aid from other eurozone countries. If Spain were to continue with this strategy, it would need to incorporate regular debt purchases by the ECB and possibly the ESM, and provide assistance to recapitalise its banks. The second strategy would be to leave the euro, which would mean a default on its gross external debt and a sharp devaluation of its currency. Both of these strategies contain negatives that need to be considered: the question is, which one would be the least detrimental to the country’s economic future? http://www.ftseglobalmarkets.com/

To alleviate its debt and escape its state of crisis, we think Spain has two strategies to choose from. The first one, already in place since 2009, involves a reduction in the fiscal and external deficits while accepting aid from other eurozone countries. If Spain were to continue with this strategy, it would need to incorporate regular debt purchases by the ECB and possibly the ESM, and provide assistance to recapitalise its banks.

The second strategy would be to leave the euro, which would mean a default on its gross external debt and a sharp devaluation of its currency.

Both of these strategies contain negatives that need to be considered: the question is, which one would be the least detrimental to the country’s economic future?

Strategy One: Spain's present strategy of adjustment...A Catch-22 situation?

Spain’s high levels of external debt mean it cannot increase its external borrowing (except for emergency borrowing from the EU or the ECB). Therefore, it must balance its current account.



Its present strategy of adjustment is clear: a restrictive fiscal policy; an improvement in cost-competitiveness to rebalance foreign trade; and the acceptance of European aid to recapitalise banks in distress. The last action hinges on purchases of government bonds to push down long-term interest rates. However, this strategy is risky.

A scenario may help us better understand this strategy: a fall in real wages due to price-stickiness discourages household demand, which has a knock-on effect to make business investment decline. Hence, there is a major decline in domestic demand and activity, making it very difficult to reduce fiscal deficit. In early 2012 we saw this in action when Spain’s fiscal deficit widened considerably, due both to tax revenue short-falls and higher-than-expected government spending. A continuation of this strategy therefore may lead to a further increase in unemployment and a decline in activity.

There could also be a reduction in the external deficit due to the decline in purchasing power. That said, imports would have to be reduced by a further 20% for Spain's current account deficit to disappear, which would mean a decline of at least 12% in domestic demand and real income.

The only hope for this strategy is that improvements in cost-competitiveness could increase Spain's exports and market share, and improved profits could eventually increase business investment.

Strategy Two: Exit from the euro, default and devaluation...A possible solution or suicide?

The other strategy would be for Spain to leave the euro, sharply devalue its currency, and inevitably default on its gross external public and private debt. This would obviously be a big problem for Spanish multinational companies, given the size of debt and the impossibility of servicing it following devaluation.

But what would the likely consequences of this strategy be?

For a start, it requires an immediate rebalancing of foreign trade. The country could no longer borrow, which would result in a much weaker economic situation in the short term.

Our econometric estimate shows elasticity to the real exchange rate of 0.73 for Spain's exports and 0 for imports, in volume terms. If we assume 30% devaluation, the foreign trade gain in volume terms would be 7.7 percentage points of GDP, which is very substantial.

Devaluation would increase the price of imports and therefore reduce real income by about 5.9 percentage points, which would leave a net gain of approximately 2 percentage points of GDP.

When the Spanish peseta was devalued in the early 1990s (twice in 1992, once in 1993), the current account deficit disappeared in 18 months, exports accelerated strongly, while domestic inflation reacted only slightly to the rise in import prices. The decline in GDP only lasted one year, and from that point growth was strong because of falling interest rates.

In today’s instance, devaluation would also increase the competitiveness of tourism and increase the surplus for these services in local currency, though perhaps not in foreign currencies such as the euro.

As financing becomes completely domestic, it is not impossible that there could be a reduction in the sovereign risk premium.

Devaluation could subsequently attract direct investment by businesses. With 30% devaluation, for example, labour costs in Spain would fall to EUR 14 per hour, 60% less than in Germany. However, since the size of Spanish industry is relatively small, new activities need to be considered for it to generate a large surplus.

Conclusion: What strategy to choose for Spain?

If the improvement in Spain's cost-competitiveness and profitability does not produce quick results, the present strategy will fail: wages would have to be reduced on a greater scale to eliminate the external deficit, and the fiscal deficit would remain very high.

The other strategy (leaving the euro, devaluation and default) could be successful if the devaluation attracted new activities, but it involves a lot of uncertainties – such as the impacts on Spanish multinationals, interest rates and foreign trade.

As stated earlier, both strategies are rather bleak, but positive aspects are still evident. Considering all of the factors, we believe that the strategy of devaluation and default could be the most efficient, particularly due to the high price elasticity of exports and the fact that Spain's entire current account deficit is accounted for by the interest on its external debt. As in 1992, it could also be effective due to the domestic financing of fiscal deficits, which will prevent a rise in interest rates.

Patrick Artus

A graduate of Ecole Polytechnique, of Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Adminstration Economique and of Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Patrick Artus is today the Chief Economist at Natixis. He began his career in 1975 where his work included economic forecasting and modelisation. He then worked at the Economics Department of the OECD (1980), before becoming Head of Research at the ENSAE. Thereafter, Patrick taught seminars on research at Paris Dauphine (1982) and was Professor at a number of Universities (including Dauphine, ENSAE, Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Armement, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées and HEC Lausanne).

Patrick is now Professor of Economics at University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. He combines these responsibilities with his research work at Natixis. Patrick was awarded "Best Economist of the year 1996" by the "Nouvel Economiste", and today is a member of the council of economic advisors to the French Prime Minister. He is also a board member at Total and Ipsos.

Website: cib.natixis.com/research/economic.aspx

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