Friday 28th November 2014
NEWS TICKER: THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27TH 2014: The Straits Times Index (STI) ended -8.70 points lower or -0.26% to 3340.96, taking the year-to-date performance to +5.56%. The FTSE ST Mid Cap Index declined -0.11% while the FTSE ST Small Cap Index declined -0.43%. The top active stocks were SingTel (-0.26%), DBS (-0.25%), ThaiBev (-4.38%), Suntec REIT (+0.26%) and OCBC Bank (+0.10%). The outperforming sectors today were represented by the FTSE ST Health Care Index (+0.47%). The two biggest stocks of the FTSE ST Health Care Index are Raffles Medical Group (-0.52%) and Biosensors International Group (+2.75%). The underperforming sector was the FTSE ST Basic Materials Index, which declined -2.14% with Midas Holdings ’ share price declining -5.09% and Geo Energy Resources’ share price gaining +2.33%. The three most active Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) by value today were the IS MSCI India (+0.26%), United SSE 50 China ETF (-0.57%), STI ETF (+0.59%). The three most active Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) by value were Suntec REIT (+0.26%), Ascendas REIT (-0.86%), CapitaCom Trust (-0.89%). The most active index warrants by value today were HSI24400MBeCW141230 (-15.73%), HSI23800MBePW150129 (+6.45%), HSI23600MBePW141230 (+11.11%). The most active stock warrants by value today were DBS MB eCW150602 (+3.33%), UOB MB eCW150415 (+5.23%), UOB MB eCW150102 (+2.38%) - Moody's has withdrawn the rating of Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank's Caa3 long-term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings, the Not Prime short-term deposit ratings and the E standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR), equivalent to a caa3 baseline credit assessment. The ratings agency says the rating has been withdrawn for its own business reasons At the time of the withdrawal, the outlook on the bank's long-term ratings was negative while the standalone E BFSR carried a stable outlook - Malaysian builder MMC Corp Bhd said earlier today that it will list its power unit Malakoff Bhd (IPO-MALB.KL) in a deal bankers expect to raise more than $1bn dollars. The IPO, for up to 30.4% of Malakoff's capital, was deferred earlier this year and approval from the Securities Commission lapsed as a result. MMC, controlled by reclusive Malaysian tycoon Syed Mokhtar Al-Bukhary, will resubmit the application within one month and expects the deal to be completed by second quarter of 2015, according to a local stock exchange filing – According to local press report the newly minted Somalia Stock Exchange expects seven companies in the telecoms, financial services and transport sectors to list when it is set up in 2015. Somalia's economy is slowly recovering from more than two decades of conflict, although the government is still battling an Islamist insurgency. Amid the chaos, some businesses have thrived, including money transfer and mobile phone firms. The Somalia Stock Exchange has opened administrative offices in Mogadishu and other Somali centres like Kismayu, as well as in Nairobi, to help recruitment and in other related issues - Moody's has upgraded to Baa1 from Baa2 the long-term deposit ratings of China CITIC Bank International Limited, and affirmed the bank's P-2 short-term deposit ratings. The bank's senior unsecured MTN program rating and deposit note/CD program ratings are also upgraded to (P)Baa1/Baa1 from (P)Baa2/Baa2, while the short-term deposit note/CD program ratings are affirmed at (P)P-2. The bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) is unchanged at baa3. The outlook on all the ratings is stable. The rating action concludes Moody's review for upgrade for China CITIC Bank International, which was initiated on September 2nd this year, after the senior unsecured bond rating of its ultimate parents CITIC Group Corporation and CITIC Limited (formerly CITIC Pacific Limited) were upgraded to A3 from Baa2. CITIC Group Corporation, wholly owned by China's Ministry of Finance, owns 78% of CITIC Limited, which in turn owns 67% of China CITIC Bank.

The Calculation for Spain

Tuesday, 31 July 2012 Written by 
The Calculation for Spain To alleviate its debt and escape its state of crisis, we think Spain has two strategies to choose from. The first one, already in place since 2009, involves a reduction in the fiscal and external deficits while accepting aid from other eurozone countries. If Spain were to continue with this strategy, it would need to incorporate regular debt purchases by the ECB and possibly the ESM, and provide assistance to recapitalise its banks. The second strategy would be to leave the euro, which would mean a default on its gross external debt and a sharp devaluation of its currency. Both of these strategies contain negatives that need to be considered: the question is, which one would be the least detrimental to the country’s economic future? http://www.ftseglobalmarkets.com/

To alleviate its debt and escape its state of crisis, we think Spain has two strategies to choose from. The first one, already in place since 2009, involves a reduction in the fiscal and external deficits while accepting aid from other eurozone countries. If Spain were to continue with this strategy, it would need to incorporate regular debt purchases by the ECB and possibly the ESM, and provide assistance to recapitalise its banks.

The second strategy would be to leave the euro, which would mean a default on its gross external debt and a sharp devaluation of its currency.

Both of these strategies contain negatives that need to be considered: the question is, which one would be the least detrimental to the country’s economic future?

Strategy One: Spain's present strategy of adjustment...A Catch-22 situation?

Spain’s high levels of external debt mean it cannot increase its external borrowing (except for emergency borrowing from the EU or the ECB). Therefore, it must balance its current account.



Its present strategy of adjustment is clear: a restrictive fiscal policy; an improvement in cost-competitiveness to rebalance foreign trade; and the acceptance of European aid to recapitalise banks in distress. The last action hinges on purchases of government bonds to push down long-term interest rates. However, this strategy is risky.

A scenario may help us better understand this strategy: a fall in real wages due to price-stickiness discourages household demand, which has a knock-on effect to make business investment decline. Hence, there is a major decline in domestic demand and activity, making it very difficult to reduce fiscal deficit. In early 2012 we saw this in action when Spain’s fiscal deficit widened considerably, due both to tax revenue short-falls and higher-than-expected government spending. A continuation of this strategy therefore may lead to a further increase in unemployment and a decline in activity.

There could also be a reduction in the external deficit due to the decline in purchasing power. That said, imports would have to be reduced by a further 20% for Spain's current account deficit to disappear, which would mean a decline of at least 12% in domestic demand and real income.

The only hope for this strategy is that improvements in cost-competitiveness could increase Spain's exports and market share, and improved profits could eventually increase business investment.

Strategy Two: Exit from the euro, default and devaluation...A possible solution or suicide?

The other strategy would be for Spain to leave the euro, sharply devalue its currency, and inevitably default on its gross external public and private debt. This would obviously be a big problem for Spanish multinational companies, given the size of debt and the impossibility of servicing it following devaluation.

But what would the likely consequences of this strategy be?

For a start, it requires an immediate rebalancing of foreign trade. The country could no longer borrow, which would result in a much weaker economic situation in the short term.

Our econometric estimate shows elasticity to the real exchange rate of 0.73 for Spain's exports and 0 for imports, in volume terms. If we assume 30% devaluation, the foreign trade gain in volume terms would be 7.7 percentage points of GDP, which is very substantial.

Devaluation would increase the price of imports and therefore reduce real income by about 5.9 percentage points, which would leave a net gain of approximately 2 percentage points of GDP.

When the Spanish peseta was devalued in the early 1990s (twice in 1992, once in 1993), the current account deficit disappeared in 18 months, exports accelerated strongly, while domestic inflation reacted only slightly to the rise in import prices. The decline in GDP only lasted one year, and from that point growth was strong because of falling interest rates.

In today’s instance, devaluation would also increase the competitiveness of tourism and increase the surplus for these services in local currency, though perhaps not in foreign currencies such as the euro.

As financing becomes completely domestic, it is not impossible that there could be a reduction in the sovereign risk premium.

Devaluation could subsequently attract direct investment by businesses. With 30% devaluation, for example, labour costs in Spain would fall to EUR 14 per hour, 60% less than in Germany. However, since the size of Spanish industry is relatively small, new activities need to be considered for it to generate a large surplus.

Conclusion: What strategy to choose for Spain?

If the improvement in Spain's cost-competitiveness and profitability does not produce quick results, the present strategy will fail: wages would have to be reduced on a greater scale to eliminate the external deficit, and the fiscal deficit would remain very high.

The other strategy (leaving the euro, devaluation and default) could be successful if the devaluation attracted new activities, but it involves a lot of uncertainties – such as the impacts on Spanish multinationals, interest rates and foreign trade.

As stated earlier, both strategies are rather bleak, but positive aspects are still evident. Considering all of the factors, we believe that the strategy of devaluation and default could be the most efficient, particularly due to the high price elasticity of exports and the fact that Spain's entire current account deficit is accounted for by the interest on its external debt. As in 1992, it could also be effective due to the domestic financing of fiscal deficits, which will prevent a rise in interest rates.

Patrick Artus

A graduate of Ecole Polytechnique, of Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Adminstration Economique and of Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Patrick Artus is today the Chief Economist at Natixis. He began his career in 1975 where his work included economic forecasting and modelisation. He then worked at the Economics Department of the OECD (1980), before becoming Head of Research at the ENSAE. Thereafter, Patrick taught seminars on research at Paris Dauphine (1982) and was Professor at a number of Universities (including Dauphine, ENSAE, Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Armement, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées and HEC Lausanne).

Patrick is now Professor of Economics at University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. He combines these responsibilities with his research work at Natixis. Patrick was awarded "Best Economist of the year 1996" by the "Nouvel Economiste", and today is a member of the council of economic advisors to the French Prime Minister. He is also a board member at Total and Ipsos.

Website: cib.natixis.com/research/economic.aspx

Related News

Related Articles

Tweets by @DataLend

DataLend is a global securities finance market data provider covering 42,000+ unique securities globally with a total on-loan value of more than $1.8 trillion.

What do our tweets mean? See: http://bit.ly/18YlGjP