Wednesday 30th July 2014
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TICKER - WEDNESDAY - JULY 30th: Avanti Mining Inc has entered into a debt financing mandate letter with a syndicate of six lenders to provide secured debt finance facilities worth $612m to develop the Kitsault molybdenum mine. Lenders include BNP Paribas, Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation, Export Development Canada, Korea Development Bank, Mizuho Bank and UniCredit Bank. The facility set out in the term sheet is comprised of $500m senior debt for a term of 10.5 years, $42m in equipment finance for a term of 5 years and $70m in the form of standby cost over-run facilities for a term of 8 years. The interest rate is LIBOR based, loan repayments are semi-annual or quarterly (for equipment finance) and there are mandatory prepayment provisions of a portion of excess free cash flow. The facility will include customary provisions for a financing of this type, including fees, representations and warranties, covenants, events of default and security customary for this type of financing - Jupiter Fund Management reports strong investment performance with assets under management rising to £33.1bn, with the asset manager benefitting from net mutual fund inflows of £875m over the first half of this year. The firm says it has maintained operating margins above 50%. Maarten Slendebroek, chief executive, says “We are pleased with the progress being made on the implementation of our growth strategy during the first half of 2014. The Board’s intention to increase cash returns to shareholders through a combination of ordinary and special dividends reflects this progress and confidence in our future growth potential. We believe this approach will allow shareholders to participate in our organic growth story while receiving an attractive yield.” There will be an analyst presentation to discuss the results on July 30th at 9.00am at FTI Consulting, 200 Aldersgate, Aldersgate Street, London, EC1A 4HD and is also accessible via a live audiocast for those unable to attend in person - CME Clearing says it will remove the Exchange-For-Swap (EFS) identifier for all NYMEX, COMEX and DME exchange futures executed in accordance with CME Rule 538 (Exchange for Related Positions). CME products were removed from EFS eligibility in October of 2010, and CBT products were removed from EFS eligibility in July of 2012. With this final transition, EFS will no longer be a supported transaction type at CME. The EFS transaction type has been harmonized into, and falls under, the Exchange for Risk (EFR) transaction referenced in Rule 538. EFR transactions are privately negotiated transactions (PNT) and include the simultaneous exchange of an Exchange futures position for a corresponding OTC swap or other OTC instrument. In addition, NYMEX, COMEX and DME exchange products will continue to be eligible for Exchange for Physical (EFP) and Exchange of Options for Options (EOO) privately negotiated transactions. Currently, an EFS transaction is represented as a TrdTyp=”12” on TrdCaptRpt messages. Effective on the above date, the TrdTyp value for these transactions should be submitted as “11” (EFR). CME Clearing will reject any NYMEX, COMEX, or DME exchange privately negotiated futures message sent as an EFS. The trade will subsequently need to be resubmitted with a valid transaction type to CME Clearing. Additionally, CME Clearing will re-categorize the Exchange of Options for Options (EOO) transaction type for all CME, CBOT, NYMEX, COMEX, and DME products. Currently, an EOO is represented as an option on an exchange for swap (EFS) in clearing and on FIXML TrdCaptRpt messages. Going forward, an EOO transaction will be represented as an option on an Exchange for Risk (EFR) - Chi-X® Japan Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of alternative market operator Chi-X® Global Holdings LLC, says local brokers Yamawa Securities Co., Ltd. and Ark Securities Co Ltd., have commenced trading on Chi-X Japan, bringing the total number of trading participants to 23. Yamawa Securities and Ark Securities will access its market centre through Intertrade’s platform - The upgrade of the cities of Bogota and Medellin by Moody’s follows the upgrade on Colombia's sovereign ratings and reflects the close economic and operational links that these cities have with the central government. The rating action also reflects Bogota and Medellin's relatively solid financial metrics and moderate debt levels. The ratings assigned to both Bogota and Medellin are supported by their strong economic position in Colombia that includes a high level of own-source revenues and diversified local economies. The positive prospects of economic growth in the country translate in supportive conditions for both cities through higher local economic growth and own-source revenue growth. The assigned ratings also consider the close oversight that Colombia's central government exerts over the country's regional and local governments. Bogota and Medellin show solid governance and management practices that have supported historical low to moderate debt levels and moderate cash financing requirements, says the ratings agency. Between 2011 and 2013, Bogota's cash financing requirements averaged -5.7% of total revenues and net direct and indirect debt averaged 18.4% of total revenues. Medellin's cash financing requirements over the same period averaged -5.8% of total revenues and debt levels averaged 17.6% of total revenues.

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The European Review

By Patrick Artus, chief economist at Natixis

The Calculation for Spain

Tuesday, 31 July 2012 Written by 
The Calculation for Spain To alleviate its debt and escape its state of crisis, we think Spain has two strategies to choose from. The first one, already in place since 2009, involves a reduction in the fiscal and external deficits while accepting aid from other eurozone countries. If Spain were to continue with this strategy, it would need to incorporate regular debt purchases by the ECB and possibly the ESM, and provide assistance to recapitalise its banks. The second strategy would be to leave the euro, which would mean a default on its gross external debt and a sharp devaluation of its currency. Both of these strategies contain negatives that need to be considered: the question is, which one would be the least detrimental to the country’s economic future? http://www.ftseglobalmarkets.com/

To alleviate its debt and escape its state of crisis, we think Spain has two strategies to choose from. The first one, already in place since 2009, involves a reduction in the fiscal and external deficits while accepting aid from other eurozone countries. If Spain were to continue with this strategy, it would need to incorporate regular debt purchases by the ECB and possibly the ESM, and provide assistance to recapitalise its banks.

The second strategy would be to leave the euro, which would mean a default on its gross external debt and a sharp devaluation of its currency.

Both of these strategies contain negatives that need to be considered: the question is, which one would be the least detrimental to the country’s economic future?

Strategy One: Spain's present strategy of adjustment...A Catch-22 situation?

Spain’s high levels of external debt mean it cannot increase its external borrowing (except for emergency borrowing from the EU or the ECB). Therefore, it must balance its current account.

Its present strategy of adjustment is clear: a restrictive fiscal policy; an improvement in cost-competitiveness to rebalance foreign trade; and the acceptance of European aid to recapitalise banks in distress. The last action hinges on purchases of government bonds to push down long-term interest rates. However, this strategy is risky.

A scenario may help us better understand this strategy: a fall in real wages due to price-stickiness discourages household demand, which has a knock-on effect to make business investment decline. Hence, there is a major decline in domestic demand and activity, making it very difficult to reduce fiscal deficit. In early 2012 we saw this in action when Spain’s fiscal deficit widened considerably, due both to tax revenue short-falls and higher-than-expected government spending. A continuation of this strategy therefore may lead to a further increase in unemployment and a decline in activity.

There could also be a reduction in the external deficit due to the decline in purchasing power. That said, imports would have to be reduced by a further 20% for Spain's current account deficit to disappear, which would mean a decline of at least 12% in domestic demand and real income.

The only hope for this strategy is that improvements in cost-competitiveness could increase Spain's exports and market share, and improved profits could eventually increase business investment.

Strategy Two: Exit from the euro, default and devaluation...A possible solution or suicide?

The other strategy would be for Spain to leave the euro, sharply devalue its currency, and inevitably default on its gross external public and private debt. This would obviously be a big problem for Spanish multinational companies, given the size of debt and the impossibility of servicing it following devaluation.

But what would the likely consequences of this strategy be?

For a start, it requires an immediate rebalancing of foreign trade. The country could no longer borrow, which would result in a much weaker economic situation in the short term.

Our econometric estimate shows elasticity to the real exchange rate of 0.73 for Spain's exports and 0 for imports, in volume terms. If we assume 30% devaluation, the foreign trade gain in volume terms would be 7.7 percentage points of GDP, which is very substantial.

Devaluation would increase the price of imports and therefore reduce real income by about 5.9 percentage points, which would leave a net gain of approximately 2 percentage points of GDP.

When the Spanish peseta was devalued in the early 1990s (twice in 1992, once in 1993), the current account deficit disappeared in 18 months, exports accelerated strongly, while domestic inflation reacted only slightly to the rise in import prices. The decline in GDP only lasted one year, and from that point growth was strong because of falling interest rates.

In today’s instance, devaluation would also increase the competitiveness of tourism and increase the surplus for these services in local currency, though perhaps not in foreign currencies such as the euro.

As financing becomes completely domestic, it is not impossible that there could be a reduction in the sovereign risk premium.

Devaluation could subsequently attract direct investment by businesses. With 30% devaluation, for example, labour costs in Spain would fall to EUR 14 per hour, 60% less than in Germany. However, since the size of Spanish industry is relatively small, new activities need to be considered for it to generate a large surplus.

Conclusion: What strategy to choose for Spain?

If the improvement in Spain's cost-competitiveness and profitability does not produce quick results, the present strategy will fail: wages would have to be reduced on a greater scale to eliminate the external deficit, and the fiscal deficit would remain very high.

The other strategy (leaving the euro, devaluation and default) could be successful if the devaluation attracted new activities, but it involves a lot of uncertainties – such as the impacts on Spanish multinationals, interest rates and foreign trade.

As stated earlier, both strategies are rather bleak, but positive aspects are still evident. Considering all of the factors, we believe that the strategy of devaluation and default could be the most efficient, particularly due to the high price elasticity of exports and the fact that Spain's entire current account deficit is accounted for by the interest on its external debt. As in 1992, it could also be effective due to the domestic financing of fiscal deficits, which will prevent a rise in interest rates.

Patrick Artus

A graduate of Ecole Polytechnique, of Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Adminstration Economique and of Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Patrick Artus is today the Chief Economist at Natixis. He began his career in 1975 where his work included economic forecasting and modelisation. He then worked at the Economics Department of the OECD (1980), before becoming Head of Research at the ENSAE. Thereafter, Patrick taught seminars on research at Paris Dauphine (1982) and was Professor at a number of Universities (including Dauphine, ENSAE, Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Armement, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées and HEC Lausanne).

Patrick is now Professor of Economics at University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. He combines these responsibilities with his research work at Natixis. Patrick was awarded "Best Economist of the year 1996" by the "Nouvel Economiste", and today is a member of the council of economic advisors to the French Prime Minister. He is also a board member at Total and Ipsos.

Website: cib.natixis.com/research/economic.aspx

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