Tuesday 28th July 2015
NEWS TICKER, Tuesday July 28th: The Spanish Mercado Alternativo Bursátil (MAB) has admitted INCLAM to list on the market’s growth company segment. The company will trade from July 29th this year. Its trading code will be INC and trading will be through a price setting mechanism which will match buy and sell orders by means of two daily auction periods or “fixings”, at 12 hrs and at 16 hrs. Stratelis Advisors is acting as registered adviser and MG Valores SV as liquidity provider. - Moody's: Al Khalij Commercial Bank (al khaliji) Q.S.C.'s asset quality and capital strengths moderated by high reliance on market funding. Al Khalij Commercial Bank (al khaliji) Q.S.C. (AKB) benefits from a solid overall financial profile which is moderated by high reliance on market funding and concentration risks, says Moody's Investors Service in the report "Al Khalij Commercial Bank (al khaliji) Q.S.C: asset quality and capital strengths are moderated by high reliance on market funding" - While German SME’s continue to be plagued by recruiting problems, according to a new KfW survey fewer are bothered about filling employment vacancies than they were back in 2010. More women and older people in the working population, increasing labour mobility and the rise in skilled labour from other EU countries is helping filling the employment gap. Even so, the survey suggests that over the longer term, skilled labour shortages could be the order of the day – In a filing with the Luxembourg Stock Exchange Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten has given notice of amended final terms to the holders of TRY77.5m notes at 10.01% due June 17th 2025 (ISIN Code: XS1247665836 and Series no. 1214) issued under the bank’s €80bn debt issuance programme. The amendment includes provision that the issuer may settlement any payment due in respect of the notes in a currency other than that specified on the due date subject to pre-agreed conditions. Deutsche Bank London is the issuing and paying agent, while Deutsche Bank Luxembourg is listing agent, paying agent and transfer agent. The Shanghai Composite Index ended down 8.5% at 3725.56, its second-straight day of losses and worst daily percentage fall since February 27th, 2007. China's main index is up 6% from its recent low on July 8, but still off 28% from its high in June. The smaller Shenzhen Composite fell 7% to 2160.09 and the small-cap ChiNext Closed 7.4%. Lower at 2683.45. The drop comes as investors wonder how long the government’s buying of blue chip stocks can last. Clearly, the government can’t be seen to be pouring good money after bad to prop up what looks to be a failed strategy of propping up the market. Disappointing corporate earnings data across the globe has affected Asia’s main indices in today’s trading. The Hang Seng Index fell 2.7%. Australia's S&PASX 200 was down 0.2%, the Nikkei Stock Average fell 1% and South Korea's Kospi was off 0.4%. Turnover also remains depressed on Chinese exchanges, with around RMB1.2trn the average volume traded, compared to more than RMB2trn before this current downturn – In other news from the Asia Pacific, New Zealand’s Financial Markets Authority (FMA) has issued a Stop Order against Green Gardens Finance Trust Limited (GGFT) and warns the public to be wary of doing business or depositing money with this company. The Stop Order prohibits GGFT from offering, issuing, accepting applications for or advertising debt securities and/or accepting further contributions, investments or deposits for debt securities – Meantime, in Australia, the Federal Court has found that Astra Resources PLC (Astra Resources) and its subsidiary, Astra Consolidated Nominees Pty Ltd (Astra Nominees), breached the fundraising provisions of the Corporations Act, as part of civil proceedings brought by ASIC. In his judgment, Justice White upheld ASIC's claims that Astra Resources and Astra Nominees breached the Corporations Act by raising funds from investors without a prospectus or similar disclosure document, as required under the law.

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The European Review

By Patrick Artus, chief economist at Natixis

The Calculation for Spain

Tuesday, 31 July 2012 Written by 
The Calculation for Spain To alleviate its debt and escape its state of crisis, we think Spain has two strategies to choose from. The first one, already in place since 2009, involves a reduction in the fiscal and external deficits while accepting aid from other eurozone countries. If Spain were to continue with this strategy, it would need to incorporate regular debt purchases by the ECB and possibly the ESM, and provide assistance to recapitalise its banks. The second strategy would be to leave the euro, which would mean a default on its gross external debt and a sharp devaluation of its currency. Both of these strategies contain negatives that need to be considered: the question is, which one would be the least detrimental to the country’s economic future? http://www.ftseglobalmarkets.com/

To alleviate its debt and escape its state of crisis, we think Spain has two strategies to choose from. The first one, already in place since 2009, involves a reduction in the fiscal and external deficits while accepting aid from other eurozone countries. If Spain were to continue with this strategy, it would need to incorporate regular debt purchases by the ECB and possibly the ESM, and provide assistance to recapitalise its banks.

The second strategy would be to leave the euro, which would mean a default on its gross external debt and a sharp devaluation of its currency.

Both of these strategies contain negatives that need to be considered: the question is, which one would be the least detrimental to the country’s economic future?

Strategy One: Spain's present strategy of adjustment...A Catch-22 situation?

Spain’s high levels of external debt mean it cannot increase its external borrowing (except for emergency borrowing from the EU or the ECB). Therefore, it must balance its current account.



Its present strategy of adjustment is clear: a restrictive fiscal policy; an improvement in cost-competitiveness to rebalance foreign trade; and the acceptance of European aid to recapitalise banks in distress. The last action hinges on purchases of government bonds to push down long-term interest rates. However, this strategy is risky.

A scenario may help us better understand this strategy: a fall in real wages due to price-stickiness discourages household demand, which has a knock-on effect to make business investment decline. Hence, there is a major decline in domestic demand and activity, making it very difficult to reduce fiscal deficit. In early 2012 we saw this in action when Spain’s fiscal deficit widened considerably, due both to tax revenue short-falls and higher-than-expected government spending. A continuation of this strategy therefore may lead to a further increase in unemployment and a decline in activity.

There could also be a reduction in the external deficit due to the decline in purchasing power. That said, imports would have to be reduced by a further 20% for Spain's current account deficit to disappear, which would mean a decline of at least 12% in domestic demand and real income.

The only hope for this strategy is that improvements in cost-competitiveness could increase Spain's exports and market share, and improved profits could eventually increase business investment.

Strategy Two: Exit from the euro, default and devaluation...A possible solution or suicide?

The other strategy would be for Spain to leave the euro, sharply devalue its currency, and inevitably default on its gross external public and private debt. This would obviously be a big problem for Spanish multinational companies, given the size of debt and the impossibility of servicing it following devaluation.

But what would the likely consequences of this strategy be?

For a start, it requires an immediate rebalancing of foreign trade. The country could no longer borrow, which would result in a much weaker economic situation in the short term.

Our econometric estimate shows elasticity to the real exchange rate of 0.73 for Spain's exports and 0 for imports, in volume terms. If we assume 30% devaluation, the foreign trade gain in volume terms would be 7.7 percentage points of GDP, which is very substantial.

Devaluation would increase the price of imports and therefore reduce real income by about 5.9 percentage points, which would leave a net gain of approximately 2 percentage points of GDP.

When the Spanish peseta was devalued in the early 1990s (twice in 1992, once in 1993), the current account deficit disappeared in 18 months, exports accelerated strongly, while domestic inflation reacted only slightly to the rise in import prices. The decline in GDP only lasted one year, and from that point growth was strong because of falling interest rates.

In today’s instance, devaluation would also increase the competitiveness of tourism and increase the surplus for these services in local currency, though perhaps not in foreign currencies such as the euro.

As financing becomes completely domestic, it is not impossible that there could be a reduction in the sovereign risk premium.

Devaluation could subsequently attract direct investment by businesses. With 30% devaluation, for example, labour costs in Spain would fall to EUR 14 per hour, 60% less than in Germany. However, since the size of Spanish industry is relatively small, new activities need to be considered for it to generate a large surplus.

Conclusion: What strategy to choose for Spain?

If the improvement in Spain's cost-competitiveness and profitability does not produce quick results, the present strategy will fail: wages would have to be reduced on a greater scale to eliminate the external deficit, and the fiscal deficit would remain very high.

The other strategy (leaving the euro, devaluation and default) could be successful if the devaluation attracted new activities, but it involves a lot of uncertainties – such as the impacts on Spanish multinationals, interest rates and foreign trade.

As stated earlier, both strategies are rather bleak, but positive aspects are still evident. Considering all of the factors, we believe that the strategy of devaluation and default could be the most efficient, particularly due to the high price elasticity of exports and the fact that Spain's entire current account deficit is accounted for by the interest on its external debt. As in 1992, it could also be effective due to the domestic financing of fiscal deficits, which will prevent a rise in interest rates.

Patrick Artus

A graduate of Ecole Polytechnique, of Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Adminstration Economique and of Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Patrick Artus is today the Chief Economist at Natixis. He began his career in 1975 where his work included economic forecasting and modelisation. He then worked at the Economics Department of the OECD (1980), before becoming Head of Research at the ENSAE. Thereafter, Patrick taught seminars on research at Paris Dauphine (1982) and was Professor at a number of Universities (including Dauphine, ENSAE, Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Armement, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées and HEC Lausanne).

Patrick is now Professor of Economics at University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. He combines these responsibilities with his research work at Natixis. Patrick was awarded "Best Economist of the year 1996" by the "Nouvel Economiste", and today is a member of the council of economic advisors to the French Prime Minister. He is also a board member at Total and Ipsos.

Website: cib.natixis.com/research/economic.aspx

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