Sunday 21st December 2014
NEWS TICKER: FRIDAY DECEMBER 19TH 2014: Scotiabank’s Commodity Price Index dropped -4.8% m/m in November (-6.1% yr/yr) and will end 2014 in a ‘deflationary’ mode, says economist Patricia Mohr. "Significant capacity expansion and the defence of market share by major oil and iron ore producers— against a backdrop of lacklustre world economic growth — account for the softness at the end of the year," she says. Mohr adds that the decision by Saudi Arabia not to reduce output to shore up international oil prices, but instead to allow prices to drop to levels curbing US shale development appears to be having a negative impact on confidence in a wide variety of other commodity as well as equity markets. She predicts prices will fall further this month, but will start to rebound in mid 201 - Jonathan Hill, the EU's financial-services commissioner, says he plans to pursue rules that separate a bank's proprietary trading from retail operations. "The sensible thing to do is to seek to make progress quickly" on the issue, Hill said. "There are still areas of risk in some of the biggest and most complicated banks,” reports Bloomberg- CME Group, said yesterday that it will change daily price limits in its CME Feeder Cattle futures effective today, pursuant to its emergency action authority. The current daily price limit for CME Feeder Cattle futures is $3.00 per hundredweight and will change to $4.50 per hundredweight effective on trade date December 18th Additionally, effective December 19th (tomorrow) these limits will have the ability to expand by 150% to $6.75 per hundredweight on any business day in the event that one of the first two contract months settles at limit on the previous trading day. CME Feeder Cattle futures have been locked limit for five consecutive days as a result of various factors. The change to daily price limits is necessary to ensure continued price discovery and risk transfer, says the CME. Daily price limits for CME Live Cattle futures will remain unchanged at $3.00 per hundredweight. Effective Friday, December 19th, these limits will have the ability to expand by 150 percent to $4.50 per hundredweight in the event that one of the first two contract months settles at limit on the previous trading day - The Straits Times Index (STI) ended +16.42 points higher or +0.51% to 3243.65, taking the year-to-date performance to +2.49%. The FTSE ST Mid Cap Index gained +0.29% while the FTSE ST Small Cap Index gained +0.71%. The top active stocks were Keppel Corp (+2.68%), SingTel (-1.02%), DBS (+2.36%), Global Logistic (-3.21%) and UOB (+0.30%). The outperforming sectors today were represented by the FTSE ST Basic Materials Index (+3.13%). The two biggest stocks of the FTSE ST Basic Materials Index are Midas Holdings (+6.38%) and Geo Energy Resources (unchanged). The underperforming sector was the FTSE ST Telecommunications Index, which declined -0.98% with SingTel’s share price declining -1.02% and StarHub’s share price declining-0.73%. The three most active Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) by value today were the IS MSCI India (+2.56%), DBXT CSI300 ETF (+0.42%), STI ETF (+0.61%). The three most active Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) by value were Ascendas REIT (-0.42%), Keppel DC REIT (unchanged), Suntec REIT (+0.26%). The most active index warrants by value today were HSI23400MBeCW150129 (+7.32%), HSI22600MBePW150129 (unchanged), HSI24000MBeCW150129 (+12.50%). The most active stock warrants by value today were KepCorp MBeCW150602 (+21.95%), DBS MB eCW150420 (+29.29%), DBS MB ePW150402 (-18.03%) - Spain’s Director of Public Prosecutions, Eduardo Torres Dulce, has resigned from the post for “personal reasons”, Spanish daily El Mundo reported this morning. A spokesman for the Public Prosecutor’s office confirmed the news by telephone to The Spain Report, saying that Mr. Torres Dulce had informed Justice Minister Rafael Catalá of his decision: “but that it perhaps would not come into effect until they find a replacement”. That decision is taken at cabinet level. The next cabinet meeting for Rajoy’s government is tomorrow morning - Hedge funds including Marshall Wace, Odey Asset Management and Lansdowne Partners are shorting OTP Bank Plc, a Hungarian lender with a Russian subsidiary whose shares have fallen almost 6% this month reports Albourne Village. All three London-based funds took or increased their position this month in OTP, Hungary’s largest lender, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The ruble rose today in Moscow after plunging as much as 19%against the dollar yesterday, when Russia’s central bank increased interest rates to 17% percent from 10.5 percent in an attempt to stem the decline. The ruble is down 52% this year and has taken a disproportionate beating in the wake of sanctions and falling oil prices. The country still has the third largest currency reserves in the world and so is unlikely to default. According to Eric Chaney, Manolis Davradakis and Greg Venizelos from AXA IM’s Research and Investment Strategy team Russia will likely resort to fiscal stimulus to contain the risk of social and political unrest. Capital controls, political unrest and even default on private hard currency debts are possible outcomes they say. They credit default swaps market is pricing a one-third probability of sovereign default within five years - Indonesia is ramping up financing for its $439bn development program, planning an almost fivefold increase in sales of project sukuk. The government is seeking to raise IDR7.14trn rupiah (around $568m) from notes that will fund particular construction ventures next year, compared with IDR1.5trn this year, which say local press reports, will help finance its estimated spending of about IDR5,519trn from 2015 to 2019 to build roads, railways and power plants.

Blog

The European Review

By Patrick Artus, chief economist at Natixis

What kind of economy would the euro zone be without Germany?

Thursday, 28 June 2012 Written by 
What kind of economy would the euro zone be without Germany? There is increasing talk about establishing federalist mechanisms (eurobonds, eurobills) and pooling certain risks and investments between euro-zone countries (European bank guarantees, recapitalisation of banks by the EFSF-ESM, increased investments by the EIB, EFSF-ESM access to ECB funding, purchases of government bonds by the ECB). Germany's criticism of these proposals is that they ultimately place all the costs and all the risks on Germany, due to its economic, fiscal and financial situation and its credibility in financial markets. It is claimed that eventually all the bills will be sent to Germany, since the other euro area countries have no fiscal or financial leeway or any credibility to guarantee deposits and loans. We shall therefore examine the economy of the euro zone excluding Germany and ask the question: Is it in such a bad situation that federalism or the pooling of risks and investments between euro-zone countries would in fact amount to potentially placing the entire burden on Germany? We think that Germany’s fears are justified. http://www.ftseglobalmarkets.com/

There is increasing talk about establishing federalist mechanisms (eurobonds, eurobills) and pooling certain risks and investments between euro-zone countries (European bank guarantees, recapitalisation of banks by the EFSF-ESM, increased investments by the EIB, EFSF-ESM access to ECB funding, purchases of government bonds by the ECB). Germany's criticism of these proposals is that they ultimately place all the costs and all the risks on Germany, due to its economic, fiscal and financial situation and its credibility in financial markets. It is claimed that eventually all the bills will be sent to Germany, since the other euro area countries have no fiscal or financial leeway or any credibility to guarantee deposits and loans.

We shall therefore examine the economy of the euro zone excluding Germany and ask the question: Is it in such a bad situation that federalism or the pooling of risks and investments between euro-zone countries would in fact amount to potentially placing the entire burden on Germany?

We think that Germany’s fears are justified.

Federalism: pooling between euro-zone countries

The resolution of the euro-zone crisis will inevitably involve establishing certain forms of federalism (eurobonds, eurobills) and the pooling of certain investments and risks (a European bank guarantee system, the recapitalisation of the banks (e.g. Spanish banks) by the EFSF-ESM, an increase in structural funds or investments by the EIB, ESM access to ECB funding).



The pooling of risks between euro-zone countries already exists: the Target 2 accounts are a pooling of bank risks among euro-zone central banks, and purchases of government bonds by the ECB pool sovereign risk.

This trend to federalism and pooling is inevitable: in a monetary union without federalism, countries with external surpluses and countries with external deficits cannot coexist permanently due to the resulting accumulation of external debt.

A number of financing needs are too substantial to be borne by a single country, e.g. for Spain the need for recapitalisation of its banks. And a number of risks (e.g. the risk of a bank run) are also too great not to be pooled.

Is this move towards federalism and pooling a trap for Germany?

The view in Germany is clearly that this move towards federalism and pooling is a trap for Germany. It is claimed that Germany will have to cover most of the costs because it has public finances in good health, growth that is now stronger, higher living standards than the countries in distress, and excess savings.

Germany also has strong credibility in financial markets, as shown by its interest rate level, and it is the only country to be able to credibly insure risks and guarantee loans.

The Germans' concern is therefore understandable: if there is federalism and a pooling of investments and risks, will Germany "receive all the bills"?

To determine whether this is a real risk, let’s examine the situation of the euro zone without Germany: is it such a worrying region, will it have to be propped up permanently by Germany?

The economic and financial situation of the euro zone without Germany: Is it serious?

Without going into greater detail for each country, we shall examine:

·                   its competitiveness, the foreign trade situation; the weight of industry;

·                   its situation regarding its technological level, skills, productivity and investment; its potential growth;

·                   the situation of its businesses and households;

·                   its public finances.

1. Foreign trade, competitiveness, weight of industry

The euro zone without Germany has:

·                   a structural external deficit;

·                   a shortfall in competitiveness;

·                   a small industrial base;

·                   a large external debt.

2. Technological level, skills, investment, productivity and potential growth, capacity for job creation

The technological level of the euro zone without Germany is fairly low, as is the population's level of education; this zone invests little, has low productivity gains, and since 2008 it has destroyed jobs massively.

3. Situation of businesses and households

Corporate profitability in the euro zone excluding Germany is low, but private (corporate and household) debt is lower than in Germany; however, household solvency has deteriorated (in Germany, household defaults are low and stable; in France, Spain and Italy, they are high and rising).

4. Public finance situation

The public finances of the euro zone excluding Germany are in a very poor state compared with Germany. Indeed Germany’s debt to GDP ratio is expected to fall, while in the euro zone excluding Germany it should rise rapidly toward 100%; Germany has a 1% primary surplus, while the euro zone excluding Germany has a 2% primary deficit.

Conclusion: Are the German fears justified?

If the euro zone were to become a federal monetary union, with solidarity between countries and pooling of certain investments (recapitalisation of banks, for example) and risks, surely the rest of the euro zone excluding Germany could only be:

·                   benefiting from transfers from Germany;

·                   benefiting from Germany's credibility in the markets;

·                   benefiting from Germany's guarantee;

Or could it share this burden with Germany? We suspect that the burden on Germany would be very heavy.

Patrick Artus

A graduate of Ecole Polytechnique, of Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Adminstration Economique and of Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Patrick Artus is today the Chief Economist at Natixis. He began his career in 1975 where his work included economic forecasting and modelisation. He then worked at the Economics Department of the OECD (1980), before becoming Head of Research at the ENSAE. Thereafter, Patrick taught seminars on research at Paris Dauphine (1982) and was Professor at a number of Universities (including Dauphine, ENSAE, Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Armement, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées and HEC Lausanne).

Patrick is now Professor of Economics at University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. He combines these responsibilities with his research work at Natixis. Patrick was awarded "Best Economist of the year 1996" by the "Nouvel Economiste", and today is a member of the council of economic advisors to the French Prime Minister. He is also a board member at Total and Ipsos.

Website: cib.natixis.com/research/economic.aspx

Related News

Related Articles

Related Blogs

Related Videos

Tweets by @DataLend

DataLend is a global securities finance market data provider covering 42,000+ unique securities globally with a total on-loan value of more than $1.8 trillion.

What do our tweets mean? See: http://bit.ly/18YlGjP